A common summary of PCI DSS v4 is that it mandates an annual crypto inventory. That is close, but not quite what the standard says, and the gap matters when an assessor asks for evidence. Requirement 12.3.3 asks for something narrower and more specific: the cryptographic cipher suites and protocols in use, documented and reviewed at least once every 12 months, with three named elements. Other requirements cover keys, certificates and cryptographic hardware.
The requirement was a best practice until 31 March 2025 and has been mandatory since. More than 18 months on, the 12-month clock has run at least once, so a single review done in a hurry before the deadline no longer covers you. The PCI DSS annual cryptographic review needs to be a repeatable process. This article sets out what the wording requires, what it leaves out, what an assessor will look at, how the “anticipated changes” clause reads now that NIST has set dates for retiring quantum-vulnerable algorithms, and where tooling such as Quantum Sentinel helps and where it does not.
What Requirement 12.3.3 actually says
PCI DSS v4.0.1, published in June 2024, is still the current version of the standard on the PCI SSC document library. The Council has started work on the next iteration: it ran a request for comments on v4.0.1 from 3 June to 20 July 2026, but has not published a successor.
As reproduced in the Council’s v4.0.1 Report on Compliance template, Requirement 12.3.3 reads:
“Cryptographic cipher suites and protocols in use are documented and reviewed at least once every 12 months, including at least the following:
- An up-to-date inventory of all cryptographic cipher suites and protocols in use, including purpose and where used.
- Active monitoring of industry trends regarding continued viability of all cryptographic cipher suites and protocols in use.
- Documentation of a plan to respond to anticipated changes in cryptographic vulnerabilities.”
So there are three deliverables. The inventory is the obvious one. The other two are easy to under-document: evidence that someone is watching whether those suites and protocols remain viable, and a written plan for what happens when they stop being viable. The testing procedure is short. The assessor will “examine documentation for cryptographic suites and protocols in use and interview personnel” to verify that the documentation and review meet every element of the requirement.
What it does not say
Read precisely, 12.3.3 is not a requirement to inventory every key, certificate and algorithm across the enterprise each year. Its object is cipher suites and protocols. It also sits inside a standard whose reach is the cardholder data environment (CDE) and the systems around it. Requirement 12.5.2 has the entity confirm its PCI DSS scope at least once every 12 months, including “all system components in the CDE, connected to the CDE, or that could impact security of the CDE”. In practice, that scope boundary is where an assessor’s interest in your 12.3.3 inventory starts and stops.
Several other v4.0.1 requirements fill in the rest of the cryptographic picture:
- 4.2.1.1: “An inventory of the entity’s trusted keys and certificates used to protect PAN during transmission is maintained.” The testing procedure checks that the inventory “is kept up to date”. The requirement does not itself set a 12-month cadence. It was also future-dated to 31 March 2025.
- 3.6.1.1 (service providers only): a documented description of the cryptographic architecture covering the algorithms, protocols and keys used to protect stored account data, including key strength and expiry date, plus an inventory of HSMs, key management systems and other secure cryptographic devices “to support meeting Requirement 12.3.4”.
- 12.3.4: hardware and software technologies in use are reviewed at least once every 12 months, including whether they still receive security fixes and a senior-management-approved plan to remediate outdated technologies.
- 3.7.4: a defined cryptoperiod for each key type in use and a process for changing keys at the end of it.
Taken together, these give a fairly complete cryptographic record for the card environment: protocols and suites (12.3.3), transmission keys and certificates (4.2.1.1), stored-data cryptography and devices for service providers (3.6.1.1), and the platforms underneath (12.3.4). None of them, individually or together, requires an inventory of cryptography outside PCI DSS scope.
Building evidence an assessor can follow
The 12.3.3 wording translates directly into fields and records. A workable evidence pack for each annual review usually contains:
- The inventory itself. Each protocol and cipher suite, with “purpose and where used”. In practice, where used is usually recorded as host, port and service. Purpose is the part tools cannot infer: it needs a human to say “PAN transmission to the acquirer” or “administrative SSH to the CDE jump host”.
- A dated review record. Who reviewed the inventory, when, what changed since the previous review and what was decided. A 12-month interval is a maximum, not a schedule, so an inventory that is only correct on review day is weak evidence.
- Trend monitoring. The sources you watch (vendor advisories, NIST publications, PCI SSC guidance) and what you concluded from them. “We read the news” is not evidence. A log of the items reviewed is.
- The response plan. What you will do when a suite or protocol in the inventory is deprecated, who owns the change and how you will find every place it is used.
The last point is where a manually maintained spreadsheet tends to fail. A plan that says “we will replace algorithm X” assumes you can find every instance of X quickly. If the inventory was compiled by asking system owners once a year, that assumption is hard to defend in the interview.
“Anticipated changes” in a post-quantum context
The text of Requirement 12.3.3 does not mention quantum computing. The Council has, however, made the connection in its own guidance. The PCI Cryptography Guidance information supplement (version 1.0, August 2025) has a section on quantum computing and crypto-agility. It states that “[t]he initial step in any approach to crypto-agility is to understand where and how you are using or relying on cryptography, for example as outlined in requirement 12.3.3 of PCI DSS v4.x”. Its first crypto-agility recommendation (CA1) is to “[i]mplement a plan detailing how cryptography is used within an organization, and what is required to migrate these systems to updated algorithms or key lengths”. The same document says PCI Standards consider quantum algorithms meeting NIST security levels 1 to 5 “acceptable for use as strong cryptography”.
The guidance also restates the PCI DSS definition of strong cryptography as a minimum of 112 bits of effective key strength, and recommends at least 128 bits “to help secure systems into the future”. The Council’s PCI Perspectives blog is running a series, The Quantum Leap: Preparing for Post Quantum Cryptography, in which industry stakeholders describe how they are making systems crypto-agile. Neither source sets a PCI DSS deadline for post-quantum migration.
What follows is our interpretation, not a PCI SSC statement. NIST’s final IR 8547 (October 2026) marks quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms at 112-bit classical security strength or more as “deprecated after 2030” and “disallowed after 2035”. RSA and elliptic-curve key exchange in today’s TLS suites fall into that group. A dated retirement schedule for the public-key algorithms behind most of your inventory is about as clear an “anticipated change in cryptographic vulnerabilities” as an organisation will get. We would expect a 12.3.3 response plan written in 2026 to say which in-scope suites and protocols rely on those algorithms, what their post-quantum or hybrid replacements are, and roughly when each will move. The UK NCSC’s migration timelines (discovery and an initial plan by 2028) point in the same direction. For the wider migration sequence, see our PQC migration readiness guide.
Why a wider inventory still pays off
PCI DSS only asks about the card environment, but there are three practical reasons to look further.
First, scope moves. Requirement 12.5.2 expects scope to be reconfirmed annually and on significant change. When a new integration connects to the CDE, an inventory that already covers the wider estate means its cryptography is already recorded before the assessor asks.
Second, the PCI SSC guidance itself notes that cryptography is often used in places “that may not be as immediately obvious, such as VPN systems, multi-factor authentication systems, authenticity of software or configuration files”. Several of those sit on the scope boundary and are easy to miss when the inventory is built system by system.
Third, the same data serves other obligations. A cryptography bill of materials (CBOM) built once for the whole estate can be filtered down to PCI DSS scope for the assessor and used, unfiltered, for post-quantum planning and for other frameworks. Building a separate inventory for each audience is how organisations end up with spreadsheets that disagree.
Where Quantum Sentinel fits, and where it does not
Quantum Sentinel is an Enterprise Cryptographic Exposure Management platform and one of our technology partners. Its compliance and regulatory readiness page describes an “audit-ready cryptographic inventory”, “reporting aligned to major frameworks” and “defensible evidence of crypto-agility”. Mapped against 12.3.3, here is what its own pages state.
The inventory element. Network discovery records, for each endpoint, “the protocol versions, cipher suites, key exchange” and the host certificate details. Each entry in its cryptographic discovery and CBOM holds where it lives (host, port, protocol and service name), the algorithm, key size, TLS version and cipher suite, and first-seen and last-seen timestamps. A rescan updates the existing entry rather than adding a duplicate. That covers “where used” and gives first-seen and last-seen dates for each entry between reviews. “Purpose” remains yours to record.
Reports and exports. The cryptographic coverage page says evidence “exports as CycloneDX 1.7 and as a report set covering post-quantum readiness and the major regulatory frameworks, in PDF, Word, Excel and CSV”. The platform datasheet lists 27 report types and 17 regulatory frameworks mapped, with PCI DSS 4.0 among them, alongside “framework dashboards” and a Crypto Governance Board Pack. It does not name a report dedicated to Requirement 12.3.3. It also states that the platform “does not by itself make an organisation compliant” with any framework.
The monitoring and plan elements. The datasheet describes policy that can ban algorithms, TLS versions and cipher suites, with drift alerts, and CBOM entries carrying NIST and CNSA 2.0 status and a named post-quantum replacement. Its posture monitoring use case tracks a Quantum Readiness Score over time. These help evidence ongoing attention and feed a response plan. The monitoring of industry trends itself, and the decisions taken, still belong to your people.
QS’s financial services page lists payment HSMs, TLS and mutual-TLS between institutions, and EMV and card cryptography among the places cryptography hides in the sector. For HSMs, QS’s coverage page and datasheet name one connector, Thales Luna Network HSM over PKCS#11, read for metadata only. Other HSMs, including payment HSMs, and cryptography inside payment terminals will need to come from vendor documentation or other tooling. For a structured way to compare platforms, see how to choose a cryptographic exposure management platform.
How Sinevis Can Help
Sinevis helps organisations prepare the evidence behind Requirements 12.3.3 and 4.2.1.1: scoping the inventory against the CDE, recording purpose and ownership, setting up the trend log and writing a response plan that takes account of the NIST post-quantum dates. We use Quantum Sentinel, one of our technology partners, for automated discovery and a continuously updated CBOM, and extend the same work into a wider post-quantum readiness assessment where that is useful.
To discuss your next annual cryptographic review, contact the Sinevis team.
Sources
- PCI Security Standards Council, PCI DSS v4.0.1 Report on Compliance Template, Revision 3 (January 2025)
- PCI Security Standards Council, Document Library: PCI DSS v4.0.1 (June 2024)
- PCI Security Standards Council, Information Supplement: PCI Cryptography Guidance, Version 1.0 (August 2025)
- PCI Security Standards Council, Request for Comments: PCI Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) v4.0.1 (3 June 2026)
- PCI Security Standards Council, The Quantum Leap: Preparing for Post Quantum Cryptography Featuring Verisec (17 November 2026)
- NIST, NIST IR 8547, Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards (final, October 2026)
- UK National Cyber Security Centre, Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography (20 March 2025)

